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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the war on terror in 2001, the military has
called hundreds of thousands of reservists to active duty.1 Fighting the war
on terror has required the largest deployment of American service men and
women since the Vietnam War.2 Reserve components now comprise about
half of the U.S. military’s forces.3 These reservists have been required to
put their civilian lives on hold and step off of the corporate ladder while
they fulfill their military orders.
Unfortunately, many of these men and women sustain disabling
injuries during their service. From 2001 to 2008, the number of disabled
veterans in the U.S. increased by over twenty-five percent to 2.9 million,
and that number has continued to increase.4 In the war on terror, the
wounded-to-killed ratio is now 16:1, the highest ratio in U.S. history.5
1. David S. Loughran, Jacob Alex Klerman & Bogdan Savych, THE EFFECT OF
RESERVE ACTIVATIONS AND ACTIVE-DUTY DEPLOYMENTS ON LOCAL EMPLOYMENT DURING
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 1 (Rand Corp. Technical Report Series, 2006), available
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR321.pdf.
2. Id.
3. 151 CONG. REC. 25,308 (2005) (statement of Rep. Pombo) (noting that “National
Guard members and members of Reserve Forces comprise about 46 percent of our total
available military manpower”).
4. Jennifer Kerr, Number of Disabled Vets Up With Iraq, Afghan Wars, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2008, 3:18 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/05/11/number-of-disabled-vetsu_n_101183.html; see
also Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Profile America Facts for Features (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb1
0-ff21.html (indicating that the number of veterans with a disability connected to service in
the armed forced was 3.3 million as of 2009).
5. See Linda Bilmes, Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: The Long-term
Costs of Providing Veterans Medical Care and Disability Benefits 2 (John F. Kennedy Sch.
of Gov’t Faculty Research, Working Paper No. RWP07-001, 2007), available at
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=4329&typ
e=FN&PersonId=177 (explaining that in Vietnam, there were 2.6 injuries per fatality, and in
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Because of medical and technological advances, “soldiers are surviving
injuries that would have killed them in previous wars . . . [and] are
returning back to the United States with short-[term] and long-term
disabilities.”6
When disabled reservists return home, they face the challenge of
reentering the workforce. The Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) protects the rights of these returning
veterans to be reemployed in the same position that they vacated to perform
their military service, or a position of like status, seniority, and pay. Under
USERRA, employers have an obligation to make reasonable efforts to help
returning veterans become qualified to perform the duties of the
reemployment position.7
Employers are obligated under USERRA to make reasonable efforts to
accommodate disabled veterans and reintegrate them into the workforce.
Those obligations may be excused if they would impose an “undue
hardship” on the employer.8 Because of the way that USERRA borrows
concepts from the Americans with Disabilities Act, the language describing
“undue hardship” under USERRA is likely to be construed in the same way
that it is under the ADA.9 In cases arising under the ADA, courts have
interpreted and applied the term “undue hardship” in ways that limit
employers’ obligations to accommodate employees’ disabilities. But
despite the important ramifications that “undue hardship” may have in
requiring employers to reemploy returning veterans, courts still have not
interpreted the term or applied it in the context of USERRA. In this
comment, I contend that the similar definitions of the term “undue
hardship” under the ADA and USERRA, the similar general purpose of the
two acts, and the lack of consensus among government agencies as to how
“undue hardship” should be interpreted under USERRA make it likely that
courts will apply ADA case law when interpreting the term under
USERRA. I argue that such importation would be problematic for four
reasons (1) the terms that the undue hardship provision delimits in each
act—“reasonable accommodation” under the ADA, and “reasonable
efforts” under USERRA—have different meanings and carry different
burdens of proof; (2) “undue hardship” analysis under the ADA is
World Wars I and II, there were fewer than two wounded service men for every soldier
killed).
6. Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1081, 1097 (2010).
7. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012).
8. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303(10) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(i) (2012) (defining
“reasonable efforts” by an employer as “actions, including training provided by an employer
that do not place an undue hardship on the employer”).
9. Kevin G. Martin, Employment Law, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 499, 512 (1995).
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inextricably entwined with “reasonable accommodation” analysis, and
courts construe those terms in ways that limit plaintiffs’ recovery; (3)
administrative guidance, while unclear, suggests that ADA case law should
not be imported to interpret undue hardship; and (4) giving a broad
interpretation to undue hardship would run counter to USERRA’s
underlying purpose. To import undue hardship from the ADA to USERRA
would, in essence, make the term a Trojan horse; the gift of useful guidance
would in practice undermine USERRA’s protections for disabled soldiers.
I argue that courts should instead construe the term narrowly under
USERRA. While it is beyond the scope of this comment to solve the
puzzle of how courts should interpret USERRA’s undue hardship
provision, I propose that USERRA’s affirmative defense of “changed
circumstances” provides a better model than ADA case law for how courts
should interpret the undue hardship provision.
I. USERRA: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Reemploying service members upon their return from duty has a longstanding history. Congress first promulgated reemployment protections for
veterans prior to America’s entry into WWII.10 As the U.S. military has
become increasingly dependent on reservist forces, the nature of
reemployment protections has changed. After the Vietnam War, Congress
repealed the draft and initiated a “Total Force Policy,” by which it came to
rely heavily on America’s peacetime volunteer force, including the
Reserves and National Guard.11 In response to this changed military
strategy, Congress also codified new veteran reemployment protections in
the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (VRRA).12 The
VRRA protected reservists’ right to reemployment and was meant to aid
soldiers’ reentry into the workforce.13 Despite the protections of the
VRRA, however, many soldiers lost their jobs after serving in the Gulf
War.14 Congress was concerned that lack of protection would lead fewer
people to enroll in the Reserves and National Guard and could distract
10. Andy P. Fernandez, The Need for the Expansion of Military Reservists’ Rights in
Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 859, 869 (2002) (describing the passage of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940).
11. Id. at 861.
12. Anthony H. Green, Reemployment Rights Under the Uniform Services Employment
and Reemployment Act (USERRA): Who’s Bearing the Cost?, 37 IND. L. REV. 213, 218
(2003).
13. Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again, Will He Be Welcome
at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 247, 252-53 (2008).
14. Id. at 254.
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those fighting abroad.15
In order to “clarify, simplify, and, where necessary, strengthen the
existing veterans’ employment and reemployment rights provisions” under
the VRRA, Congress passed USERRA in 1994.16 USERRA’s purpose is
threefold:
(1) to encourage non-career service in the uniformed services
by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian
careers and employment which can result from such service;
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons
performing service in the uniformed services as well as to their
employers, their fellow employees, and their communities by
providing for the prompt reemployment of such persons upon
their completion of such service; and
(3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because of their
service in the uniformed services.17
In furtherance of this purpose, USERRA creates an entitlement for service
members to be reemployed upon their return from uniformed service.18
For service members to qualify for benefits under USERRA, their
discharge must not be characterized as dishonorable or bad conduct, a
dismissal, or being dropped from the rolls.19 Section 4312 of USERRA
provides that members of the armed forces or reserves who (1) properly
notify employers of their need to take a uniformed service-related absence;
(2) take a cumulative absence of no more than five years; and (3) properly
reapply to work, are entitled to reemployment.20 Additionally, USERRA
provides that an individual who returns from a period of service greater
than ninety days shall be reemployed “in the position of employment in
which the person would have been employed if the continuous employment
of such person with the employer had not been interrupted by such service,
or a position of like seniority, status and pay, the duties of which the person
is qualified to perform.”21 These same entitlements extend to service
members who incur or aggravate an injury or disability during the course of

15. See 139 CONG. REC. 8978 (1993) (statement of Rep. Clement) (“[Without
protection] from discrimination or reprisal on the job as a result of their service, it will be
increasingly difficult to recruit Americans to serve.”); see also 139 CONG. REC. 8977 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Stump) (“This bill will help our forces to concentrate totally on the
purpose of their mission.”).
16. Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, New York, 75 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 65 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2006).
18. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (2006).
19. 38 U.S.C. § 4304 (2006).
20. Duarte v. Agilent Techs. Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d. 1039, 1045 (D. Colo. 2005).
21. 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(2)(A) (2006).
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their service.22
II. “REASONABLE EFFORTS” TO ACCOMMODATE AND “UNDUE HARDSHIP”
UNDER USERRA
To be reemployed, a returning service member must be able to
perform the essential tasks of the position.23 Whether a task is “essential”
depends on its relationship to the actual performance requirements of the
position, and not merely the written job description.24 The definition of
essential tasks is imported directly from the ADA.25 Honorably discharged
service members with disabilities may no longer be able to perform the
duties of the job they left when they were called to duty.
Where an employee has incurred or aggravated a disability in the
course of military service, USERRA requires that an employer make
“reasonable efforts” to help the employee become qualified to perform the
essential tasks of the reemployment position.26 If the returning service
member still cannot perform the reemployment position despite the
employer’s reasonable efforts to accommodate him or her, the employer is
obligated to find a position of equivalent seniority, status and pay for which
the veteran is qualified or could become qualified with the aid of the
employer’s reasonable efforts.27
Regulations promulgated by the
Department of Labor explain that the appropriate level of accommodation
depends on situation-specific factors, including the nature of the service
member’s disability and the job requirements of the position.28 The
regulations state: “[s]uch accommodations may include placing the
reemployed person in an alternate position; on ‘light duty’ status;
modifying technology or equipment used in the job position; revising work
practices; or, shifting job functions.”29 Additionally, the reemployment
22. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(e)(2)(A) (2006).
23. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(9) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012).
24. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 70 Fed.
Reg. 75,274 (Dec. 19, 2005) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1002) [hereinafter USERRA
Regulations].
25. The ADA lists many factors that qualify a job function as “essential,” including
whether: (1) the position exists to perform the function; (2) there are a limited number of
employees to perform the job function; and/or (3) the incumbent is hired specifically for his
or her ability to perform the function because it requires a high level of expertise. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(2) (2012).
26. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012).
27. 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(2)(A); USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, 9 NO.
2 LEAVE & DISABILITY COORDINATION CENTER HANDBOOK NEWSL. 5 (Thompson Publ’g
Grp., 2005) [hereinafter USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship].
28. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,274-75.
29. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,277; 38 U.S.C. § 4303(9), (10), (15); §
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position must be one that does not pose a risk of harm to either the service
member performing it or colleagues.30
There is a limit, however, to the efforts that employers must make to
accommodate returning disabled service members. USERRA defines
“reasonable efforts” by an employer as “actions,” such as training the
employee, that do not place “undue hardship” on the employer.31 Section
4303(15) of USERRA states that “[t]he term ‘undue hardship’, in the case
of actions taken by an employer, means actions requiring significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of [enumerated factors].”32
These factors include: (1) the nature and cost of the action; (2) the overall
financial resources required to take the action; and (3) the action’s effect on
the expenses, resources, and operations of the facility when measured
against the employer’s overall size.33
Undue hardship, which delimits the scope of employers’ reasonable
efforts to accommodate disabled veterans, requires clarification that courts
have yet to provide. This comment focuses on how courts are likely to
interpret undue hardship and how courts should interpret the term.
III. FOR LACK OF A BETTER ALTERNATIVE, COURTS WILL LIKELY IMPORT
ADA CASE LAW TO INTERPRET “UNDUE HARDSHIP” UNDER
USERRA
There is a strong possibility that courts will import ADA case law to
interpret “undue hardship” under USERRA. Both USERRA and the ADA
require employers to accommodate disabled veterans up to the point that
providing accommodations imposes an undue hardship on the employer.34
In fact, USERRA’s definition of undue hardship mirrors that of the ADA.35
The ADA defines undue hardship as an “action requiring significant
difficulty or expense,” when considered in light of enumerated factors—the
same factors listed under the USERRA definition.36 Additionally, under
both acts, undue hardship is an affirmative defense for which the employer
4313(a)(3) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 103–65, pt. 1, at 31 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103–158, at 53
(1993).
30. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,277.
31. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(10); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(i) (2012).
32. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(15).
33. Id.
34. Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Returning Veterans, 24 NO. 11 EMPL. PRAC.
UPDATE 1, 4 (Thompson Publ’g Grp., Nov. 2011).
35. See Green, supra note 12, at 238 (noting that "the USERRA and ADA have
basically the same definition of undue hardship”).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2006). ADA undue hardship factors are delineated in
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2006), while USERRA undue hardship considerations are
outlined in 38 U.S.C. § 4303(15) (2006).
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bears the burden of proof.37
Courts have interpreted terms within reemployment protection laws in
light of their predecessors.
For example, the term “reasonable
accommodation” was one of a number of provisions that the ADA
imported from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA’s predecessor;
courts have interpreted the terms identically under both Acts.38 Similarly,
case precedent interpreting the language of USERRA’s predecessor, the
VRRA, is considered authoritative to the extent that USERRA’s language
parallels the VRRA.39
At least facially, the ADA seems to be a reasonable model for
USERRA’s disability provisions, as it shares a general purpose with
USERRA. Like USERRA, the ADA is primarily an anti-discrimination
law; Congress passed the ADA to “provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”40 Reemployment is also a fundamental goal of the ADA.
Just as USERRA seeks to reintegrate veterans into the workplace, the ADA
seeks to “bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social
mainstream of American life.”41 Similarly, the ADA requires employers to
take affirmative steps to accommodate disabled employees if such an
accommodation would eliminate a barrier to employment.42 Hence, the two
acts provide protections for two different, yet overlapping, classes of
people: disabled Americans and U.S. veterans.
Many practitioners believe that courts will interpret undue hardship
under USERRA in the same way that they have interpreted the term under
the ADA.43 Lawyers within the Department of Labor (DOL), the agency
37. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(2) (2006) with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006);
see also H. Craig Manson, The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act of 1994, 47 A.F. L. REV. 55, 70 (1999) (“USERRA provides an employer with three
affirmative defenses in an action to enforce a service member/employee’s reemployment
rights . . . [including] undue hardship . . . .”).
38. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, pt. 1, at 19-21 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2449, 2454 (stating the House Committee’s opinion that the body of case law that evolved
under the VRRA should apply in interpreting USERRA’s provisions to the extent that it is
consistent with the VRRAt); Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 34, at 6 (“In USERRA actions,
the VRRA precedent is considered authoritative to the extent the latter’s statutory language
parallels the former.”); see also Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir.
2004) (stating that courts may rely on the case law developed under the VRRA in
interpreting USERRA).
40. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d 538 at 541 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a), (b)(1)).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
304; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).
43. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 9, at 512 (predicting that an exception to the general
reemployment guarantee in USERRA is “likely to be interpreted in a similar fashion” as the
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responsible for enforcing USERRA, share this view.44 Even USERRA’s
National Counsel believes that courts will import ADA case law to
USERRA in interpreting undue hardship because courts have “no better
alternative.”45 But because no case has interpreted undue hardship under
USERRA, lawyers admit “it is very difficult to speak definitively about
how [the term] will be construed and applied by the courts.”46 In addition
to the absence of case law, there is also no Memorandum of Understanding
between the EEOC and the DOL regarding this issue.47 The first court
forced to interpret undue hardship under USERRA will have to address to
what extent, if at all, ADA case law should be imported to inform the term.
IV. COURTS SHOULD NOT RELY ON ADA CASE LAW TO INTERPRET
“UNDUE HARDSHIP” UNDER USERRA
The undue hardship provision of USERRA should be interpreted more
narrowly than under the ADA to reflect the differences in: (1) the text of
the definitions in the respective Acts; (2) what the undue hardship
provision delimits (reasonable accommodation versus reasonable efforts);
(3) administrative guidance regarding interpretation of the Acts; and (4) the
statutes’ specific purposes (accommodating disability versus promptly
reemploying veterans).
A. The definitions of undue hardship under the ADA and USERRA differ in
a small but significant way
Although USERRA directly borrows the ADA’s definition of undue
hardship, there is a key difference between the acts’ first phrases. Under
the ADA, the definition of undue hardship reads: “In determining whether
an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity,
ADA);. see also Fernandez, supra note 10, at 882 (explaining that the similarities between
USERRA and the ADA make it likely that undue hardship will be interpreted similarly
under both acts); Back from Military Service and Disabled: Special Treatment Needed, 18
NO. 5 ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSL. 1 (Thompson Publ’g Grp., 2007) (describing the
general perception that “‘[u]ndue hardship’ means the same thing in USERRA that it does in
the ADA”).
44. See USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, supra note 27 (stating one
DOL lawyer’s assumption that undue hardship will be interpreted similarly under USERRA
and the ADA).
45. Interview with Matt Levin, Department of Labor (DOL) National USERRA
Counsel (Dec. 8, 2011). Mr. Levin believes courts will use ADA case law to interpret
undue hardship under USERRA because there is no other definitive source of guidance;
there has not been significant case law interpreting the term in the USERRA context.
46. USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, supra note 27.
47. USERRA and the ADA: An Unclear Relationship, supra note 27.

GINGRANDE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1120

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/21/2013 4:54 PM

[Vol. 15:4

factors to be considered include (i) the nature and cost of the
accommodation needed under this chapter . . . .”48 In contrast, the
definition of undue hardship under USERRA states: “[t]he term ‘undue
hardship’, in the case of actions taken by an employer, means actions
requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of (A)
the nature and cost of the action needed under this chapter . . . .”49
USERRA’s use of the word “action” implicitly references its conception of
“reasonable efforts,” which USERRA defines as “actions required of an
employer.”50 The difference between the ADA’s explicit reference to
“accommodation” and USERRA’s implicit reference to “reasonable
efforts” should affect how courts interpret undue hardship under the two
laws.
B. Because reasonable effort under USERRA imposes a heavier burden on
employers than reasonable accommodation does under the ADA, these
terms alter the context in which undue hardship should be evaluated
USERRA regulations make clear that “reasonable efforts” are
different than “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA.51 USERRA’s
definition places a heavier burden on employers than the ADA. In addition
to requiring employers to modify technology or equipment used in the job
position, revise work practices, or shift an employee’s job functions,52
USERRA’s standard of “reasonable efforts” requires an employer to train
and retrain an employee with a disability to perform his escalator
position—the job that he had previously held, after including any
promotions that he would reasonably be expected to have attained if he
continued working for his employer instead of serving in the military.53 If
the employee cannot perform the job even with this training, the employer
will be required to reemploy the service member in a position that is
equivalent in seniority, status, and pay to his escalator position, provided
that he is qualified for that equivalent position.54 At this stage, the
employer again must help the employee become qualified for that
equivalent position.55 If such a position is unavailable, then the disabled
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
49. 38 U.S.C § 4303(15) (2006) (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,277.
52. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,270-71; 38 U.S.C. § 4303(9), (10),
(15) (2006); § 4313(a)(3) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 103–65, pt. I, at 31 (1993); S. REP. NO.
103–158, at 53 (1993).
53. 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(2)(A).
54. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.197 (2005).
55. Id.

GINGRANDE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE IMPORT OF UNDUE HARDSHIP

8/21/2013 4:54 PM

1121

employee, consistent with the particular circumstances of his case, is
entitled to a position that approximates the equivalent position in terms of
seniority, status, and pay.56
Thus, unlike the ADA’s “reasonable
accommodation,” which does not require an employer to find a new job for
the disabled employee,57 USERRA’s “reasonable efforts” to accommodate
an employee’s disability may require an employer to search out and offer a
job that the disabled service member can perform.58 To this end, employers
have the burden of presenting the returning disabled service member with a
list of all of the positions for which he or she may be qualified.59
There are further differences between an employer’s obligations under
USERRA and under the ADA. Under the ADA, courts interpret reasonable
accommodation as limited by other employees’ settled expectations. In
U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the Supreme Court held that an accommodation
that infringes on an employer’s seniority system is not reasonable because
the “typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by
creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.”60
U.S. Airways strongly suggests that a “reasonable” accommodation under
the ADA cannot require giving a disabled employee a position held by a
more senior employee.
Additionally, although “‘reasonable
accommodation’ may include . . . [an employee’s] reassignment to a vacant
position,”61 courts have held that an employer is not required to reassign a
disabled employee to a vacant position if that employer has a policy of
hiring the most qualified person for the job.62 This interpretation of
“reasonable accommodation” essentially requires disabled individuals to
compete with the general applicant pool for open positions.
Under USERRA, however, an employer may not refuse to reemploy a
returning service member on the basis that another employee replaced him
during his absence.63 Fryer v. A.S.A.P. Fire & Safety Corp. illustrates this
56. Sharon M. Erwin, When the Troops Come Home: Returning Reservists, Employers
and the Law, 19 HEALTH LAW. 1, 10-11 (2007).
57. Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[E]mployers
need not create a new job or even modify an essential function of a vacant job in order to
make it suitable for the disabled employee”).
58. Martin, supra note 9, at 510-512.
59. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,261-62.
60. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 392 (2002).
61. 42 U.S.C.§ 12111(9) (2006).
62. See Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the ADA
does not require an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position
when it would violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most
qualified candidate).
63. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.139(a) (2012) for a codification of this scenario in the
regulations. See also Murphree v. Commc’ns Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704, 710
(E.D. La. 2006) (rejecting the employer’s argument that hiring of a replacement employee
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principle. In Fryer, an employee who was working for A.S.A.P Fire &
Safety Corporation (ASAP) selling sprinklers was called to military duty. 64
Upon his return from service, ASAP claimed he could not be reemployed
because his position had been filled; instead, ASAP rehired Fryer as a
sprinkler helper.65 The sprinkler helper position, however, did not include
the same benefits or opportunity for commission as his previous position.66
Despite ASAP’s reemployment of Fryer, ASAP was required to terminate
or transfer the replacement employee in order to reemploy Fryer in his
previous position; therefore, the court held that hiring Fryer as a sprinkler
helper did not meet USERRA’s strict reemployment requirements.67 This
case is not an anomaly. USERRA’s regulations explicitly state that an
employer’s obligation to reemploy a returning service member may require
terminating the employee who was hired to replace the service member
when the service member left for military duty.68
Additionally, through legal victories, employers have limited the
scope of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
They have not done so under USERRA. The ADA does not require
employers to create a part-time position to accommodate a disabled
employee, or to displace a temporary worker to accommodate a disabled
worker.69 An employer also has no obligation to create a “light duty”
position for a disabled employee under the ADA.70 Courts have further
held that “an accommodation that would result in other employees having
on a permanent basis constitutes changed circumstances that foreclose an employer’s
obligation to reemploy a returning veteran).
64. Fryer v. A.S.A.P. Fire & Safety Corp., 680 F. Supp. 2d 317, 320-21 (D. Mass.
2010).
65. Id. at 321-22.
66. Id. at 322.
67. Id. at 327.
68. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.139(a) (2012). Note, however, that USERRA requires that in
reemploying returning employee-service members, employers must not displace or deprive
the benefits of other employee-service members in a way that unlawfully infringes upon
their rights under Title V, Veterans’ Preference. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(g) (2006); 5 U.S.C. §
2108 (2006).
69. See Dalton v. Subaru–Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating
that an employer is not required to create new positions for disabled employees under the
ADA); Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employer
was not required to create a part-time position for a disabled employee where the employer
had already eliminated all part-time positions); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 318
n. 11 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an employer was not required to reemploy a
recovering employee on a part-time basis).
70. See Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that an employer is not required to create light duty jobs to accommodate disabled
employees); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an employer is under no duty to keep a disabled employee “on unpaid leave indefinitely
until a suitable position opens up”).
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to work harder or longer” is unreasonable under the ADA.71 These
holdings all run contrary to USERRA, under which an employer may be
required to create part-time and light-duty positions and displace or
terminate other workers to reemploy a disabled service member.72 Case
law interpreting “reasonable accommodation” therefore creates fewer
protections for disabled veterans under the ADA than case law interpreting
“reasonable efforts” to accommodate veterans under USERRA.
C. Undue hardship analysis under the ADA is entangled with analysis of
the term “reasonable accommodation”
As the above sections have indicated, under the ADA, “undue
hardship” delimits the extent of “reasonable accommodation,” a term not
used in USERRA. Under the ADA, a cost-benefit analysis is required at
two levels of inquiry: first, to determine whether the accommodation is
“reasonable” and second, if it imposes an “undue hardship.” The costbenefit analysis for each inquiry is different. To be reasonable, an
accommodation’s costs must not be “clearly disproportionate to the
benefits it will produce.”73 These costs are not only financial, but may also
include actions detrimental to other employees.74 The reasonableness
inquiry is a “generalized” one that requires looking at costs and benefits in
the “run of cases.”75 The employee must identify an accommodation that
achieves a rough proportionality between costs and benefits.76
By contrast, the undue hardship inquiry is confined to the operations
of the specific employer.77 In Borkowski v. Valley Central School District,
one of the few cases to explicitly state how courts should analyze undue
hardship, the court explained that judges should “undertake a refined

71. Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094. See also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that an accommodation that infringes on the rights of other employees is not
reasonable); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1172 (1996) (stating that an accommodation that imposes undue hardship on the
operation of an employer’s program is not required under the ADA); Milton v. Scrivner,
Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995) (“An accommodation that would result in other
employees having to work harder or longer hours is not required.”).
72. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,274-75.
73. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995). Green,
supra note 12, at 229.
74. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
75. Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
76. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139.
77. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995)
(assessing the factors to be evaluated in determining whether an otherwise-reasonable
accommodation would impose undue hardship and stating that the financial condition of an
employer is only one consideration).
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analysis” and consider both “the industry to which the employer belongs as
well as the individual characteristics of the particular defendantemployer.”78 To prove undue hardship, employers need not show that an
accommodation would drive them to the brink of insolvency.79 They also
need not measure the costs and benefits of the proposed accommodation
with “mathematical precision.”80 Instead, employers need only use
“common sense” in balancing costs and benefits in light of the listed
factors in the definition.81
But despite these distinctions in the two concepts, in practice courts’
analyses of whether an accommodation is reasonable and whether the
accommodation creates an undue hardship under the ADA are nearly
identical. The Borkowski court itself acknowledged that, after an employee
has identified a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, “the difference
between . . . [demonstrating] the unreasonableness of the accommodation
and demonstrating that the accommodation imposes an undue hardship
becomes blurred.”82 Employers, armed with more information than
employees concerning industry practices and their own organizations in
particular, tend to make a barrage of arguments about the effect that an
accommodation will have on their company. Courts do not draw a bright
line between what information is sufficiently specific to the employer to
constitute undue hardship, and what information is general enough to
address whether the proposed accommodation is reasonable in the general
“run of cases.”83 In a line of cases including Hall v. USPS, in which the
Sixth Circuit stated that an accommodation is not reasonable if it places an
undue burden on the employer, courts have collapsed the question of
whether an undue hardship exists into that of whether an accommodation is
reasonable.84
In U.S. Airways the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the distinction
78. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139. Note that the legislative history of the ADA equates
“undue hardship” to “unduly costly.” S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989). Borkowski places
this inquiry in the context of assessing the employer’s specific circumstances.
79. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31. Congress rejected a provision that would have defined
an undue hardship as one that threatened the continued existence of the employer. Id.
80. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 140.
81. Id.; Green, supra note 12, at 230.
82. Green, supra note 12, at 230 (citing Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 137).
83. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
84. Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Sch. Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (determining that an accommodation is not
reasonable if it imposes on the employer “undue financial and administrative burdens,” or
requires a “fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program”) (citing Southeastern
Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 & 412 (1979)); cf. U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 402
(noting that ordinary summary judgment principles reconcile reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship).
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between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. The Supreme
Court explained that
a demand for an effective accommodation could prove
unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations,
but on fellow employees . . . because it will lead to dismissals,
relocations, or modification of employee benefits to which an
employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of the
business itself, may be relatively indifferent.85
In U.S. Airways, the court established assessments of reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship as separate, consecutive inquiries, and
asserted that the reasonable accommodation inquiry requires examining a
broader set of costs than does undue hardship, which focuses on the
accommodation’s effects on the specific employer.
Even the Court’s decision in U.S. Airways, however, could not
disentangle the analysies of reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship. The district court in U.S. Airways reasoned that altering U.S.
Airways’ seniority system in order to transfer an employee with a bad back
to a less physically demanding position “would result in undue hardship to
both the company and its nondisabled employees.”86 The Supreme Court
then used the same facts and a similar analysis to hold that an
accommodation that requires altering a seniority system is not
“reasonable.”87 Following this logic, the Eastern District of Texas cited
U.S. Airways and other cases in Bennett v. Calabrasian for the proposition
that the analysis regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
is the same.88 The Bennett court failed to heed the distinction in the costbenefit analyses required by the two terms, suggesting in a footnote that
“undue hardship exists if [an] employer ‘incurs anything more than a de
minimis cost’ [in providing it],” hence opening the door for virtually any
hardship to be deemed “undue.”89 The Bennett court employed undue
hardship analysis to support its holding that changing the time of a disabled

85. U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 399-400.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 405.
88. See Bennett v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 815, 836-37 (E.D. Tex.
2004) (asserting that undue hardship analysis and reasonable accommodation analysis are
nearly identical).
89. Bennett, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (citing Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244
F.3d 495, 500 (2001)). Note that the court’s citation to Bruff in this instance is questionable.
Bruff is a Title VII case regarding religious accommodation, which imposes very different
standards than the ADA. The court’s willingness to impose such a minimal burden on the
employer to show undue hardship further reveals why importing the term to USERRA
would decrease protections for disabled service members.
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plaintiff’s shift was not a reasonable accommodation.90
Because what little ADA case law interpreting undue hardship exists
is inextricably entangled with analysis of reasonable accommodation, using
this case law to interpret USERRA would be unhelpful at best, and
counterproductive at worst. The way in which courts have narrowly
construed reasonable accommodation runs counter to USERRA case law,
which imposes a comparatively heavier obligation on employers to
accommodate returning service members who incur disabilities while
serving the nation. This argument is further developed in Section F, infra.
Importing ADA case law would risk importing the inapplicable standard
for reasonable accommodation into USERRA under the guise of undue
hardship.
D. Undue hardship is contextualized within different proof structures
under the ADA and USERRA
Importing ADA case law to interpret “undue hardship” under
USERRA would also be inappropriate because the proof structures
encompassing undue hardship under the two Acts are different. Under
USERRA, after the plaintiff has met the three initial elements91 required for
reemployment and has shown that the employee incurred or aggravated a
disability during service, the employer must make reasonable efforts to
accommodate him or her or else bear the burden of proving undue
hardship.92 USERRA regulations emphasize this burden, stating that
“employer defenses . . . [including undue hardship] are affirmative ones,
and the employer carries the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that any one or more of these defenses is applicable.”93 In
contrast, under the ADA, the employee has the burden of production to
identify a plausible accommodation that would allow him or her to perform

90. Bennett, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 838. Conversely, in Riel v. Elec. Data Sys., 99 F.3d
678, 681, 683 (5th Cir. 1996), the court held that neither adjusting a disabled employee’s
deadlines nor transferring him to a teaching position without such deadlines was
unreasonable “in the run of cases.” The court chastised the employer for attempting to place
the burden of proof of undue hardship on the employee by refusing to plead the affirmative
defense and then attacking the employee’s proposed accommodations as unreasonable by
using evidence specific to the employer’s circumstances. Id. Even the court in this case,
however, conceded that “the terms ‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘undue hardship’ often
go hand-in-hand,” and that “[t]he evidence of reasonableness ‘in the run of cases’ and undue
hardship will often be overlapping and resist neat compartmentalization.” Id.
91. See supra section II.
92. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(10) (2006); 43 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(2) (2006); Green, supra note 12,
at 229.
93. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.139(d) (2012).
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the essential functions of the job.94 After the employee makes the initial
showing that a reasonable accommodation exists, the employer can refute
the reasonableness of the accommodation, and/or assert undue hardship as
an affirmative defense.95
A sampling of ADA case law shows that plaintiffs’ claims are likely
to be rejected at the reasonable accommodation stage of inquiry, when the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Hence, courts have rarely needed to
address whether accommodation poses an undue hardship on an employer.
Engaging in proper undue hardship analysis, where the burden is on the
employer to prove that an accommodation is unduly costly given its own
specific finances, among other factors, would likely result in more plaintiff
victories (since employers haled into court are often large, profitable
companies). The ADA’s framework of reasonable accommodation instead
precludes these plaintiff victories, since courts deem accommodations
unreasonable in the general run of cases without ever assessing whether the
accommodation would be unduly costly to the particular employer.96
In contrast, under USERRA’s proof structure, the burden is on the
employer to prove that it could not accommodate a veteran through
reasonable efforts. To prove that a veteran cannot be reemployed, the
employer would have to successfully argue that its “reasonable efforts”
proved futile in three different contexts: (1) the effort to train and retrain
the disabled veteran to perform his previous job; (2) the effort to help a
veteran become able to perform an equivalent position (of like seniority,
status, and pay); and (3) the effort to accommodate the veteran in a position
that most closely approximates the equivalent position (which may include
a less-skilled or lesser-paying position).97 Hence, while undue hardship
analysis is rarely conducted under the ADA because courts rule against
plaintiffs before even reaching the question of undue hardship, under
USERRA, undue hardship analysis has rarely been conducted because
“there typically has been something the employer can do to accommodate
and reemploy a returning disabled veteran.”98
94. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995).
95. Id.
96. The ADA framework, which places the burden on employees of proving that an
accommodation is “reasonable,” has led critics to argue that ADA case law demonstrates “a
recurring attraction toward rules that avoid merit evaluation of the burden accommodation
places on the employer.” Cheryl L. Anderson, What is “Because of the Disability” under
the Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the
Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 377-80 (2006).Ω
97. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75,273; 20 C.F.R. § 1002.198 (2012).
98. Interview with Matt Levin, Department of Labor (DOL) National USERRA
Counsel (Dec. 8, 2011). Mr. Levin partly attributes this result to the fact that the DOL is
aggressive in pursuing USERRA claims that it deems meritorious. Under USERRA,
returning veterans can file a claim with the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (an
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USERRA’s current framework—under which the burden to prove the
reasonableness of efforts to accommodate is on the employer, not the
employee—is consistent with the goal of reemploying disabled service
members. Contaminating undue hardship analysis under USERRA with
the ADA’s interpretation of reasonable accommodation would undermine
this framework due to the burden-shifting proof structure it would import.
E. Regulatory guidance suggests that ADA interpretations of undue
hardship should not be imported to USERRA
USERRA regulations imply that ADA case law should not be
imported to assess undue hardship. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)
has the statutory authority to enforce and promulgate regulations of
USERRA.99 In 2005, the DOL published final regulations implementing
USERRA that became effective on January 18, 2006.100 In the regulations,
the DOL discusses situations in which the ADA might be imported to
USERRA. One example regards an interpretation of what makes someone
“qualified” for reemployment. USERRA defines “qualified” as “having
the ability to perform the essential tasks of the position.”101 USERRA’s
legislative history does not reveal whether “essential tasks” is defined the
same way as “essential functions” under the ADA; however, the DOL
proactively adopted the regulatory definition of “essential functions” under
the ADA.102 The DOL explained that this change was adopted for purposes
of “regulatory consistency.”103
While this argument for “regulatory consistency” might have opened
the door to importing other terms from the ADA to USERRA, the DOL
emphasized that certain ADA terms should not be imported to USERRA.
For example, the DOL explicitly rejected the suggestion that it adopt and
apply the ADA’s concept and interpretation of reasonable accommodation

agency of the DOL). If the DOL concludes that the complaint is valid, it shall “attempt to
resolve the complaint by making reasonable efforts to ensure that the person or entity named
in the complaint complies with the relevant provisions” of the Act. 38 U.S.C. § 4322(d)
(2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.290 (2012). If the employer does not comply, the
claimant can request that the DOL refer the complaint to the Secretary of Labor, who may
bring a civil action on the complainant’s behalf. 38 U.S.C. § 4322(e). The claimant also
retains the right to privately litigate the claim. Id.
99. 38 U.S.C. § 4322 (2006).
100. Jonathan A. Segal, Questions and Answers about DOL’s Final USERRA Orders,
52 PRAC. LAW. 23 (2006); 70 Fed. Reg. 75,246 (Dec. 19, 2005) (codified at 20 C.F.R.
1002).
101. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(9) (2006).
102. USERRA Regulations, supra note 24, at 75, 274.
103. Id. at 27, 274.
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to USERRA.104 The DOL first noted that USERRA does not include the
term reasonable accommodation.105 The DOL then went on to state:
In addition, although interpretations of the ADA may be useful in
providing some guidance under USERRA’s provisions regarding
accommodating an employee with a disability, the Department is
reluctant to adopt extensive portions of complex regulations
promulgated under other statutes not administered or enforced by
the Department, and notes that there are significant differences in
the coverage of the two statutes.106
Because the DOL did not specifically apply this reasoning to address
whether courts should rely on ADA case law when interpreting the term
“undue hardship” under USERRA, the question remains unanswered.
However, given how intertwined the concept of reasonable accommodation
is with undue hardship under the ADA,107 the DOL’s admonishment that
the term “reasonable accommodation” should not be imported to USERRA
supports the argument that courts should also not import ADA case law to
interpret undue hardship under USERRA.
F. Importing ADA case law to interpret undue hardship under USERRA
would contravene USERRA’s underlying purpose
Importing ADA case law to interpret undue hardship under USERRA
would be anathema to USERRA’s purpose. The legislative history and
purpose of USERRA support a narrow reading of undue hardship. In Coffy
v. Republic Steel Corp., the Supreme Court declared that the Act upon
which USERRA was based, the VRRA, “is to be liberally construed for the
benefit of the returning veteran.”108 USERRA is a recodification of the
VRRA intended to expand veterans’ reemployment protections and ease
service members back into civilian life when they return from service.109
Courts look to USERRA’s underlying purpose in interpreting the statute
and construe USERRA to serve the legislative goal of enabling individuals
to fulfill military obligations without bearing the loss of civilian
employment.110 The DOL has given regulatory authority to this liberal
construction of USERRA. The preamble to the USERRA regulations states

104. Id. at 75, 277.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra pt. III.2.
108. Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980).
109. 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (2006).
110. See McGuire v. United Parcel Serv., 152 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1998) (“USERRA
is to be liberally construed in favor of those who served their country.”).
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that “the interpretive maxim” that applies when construing the Act is the
Supreme Court’s proclamation that it “is to be liberally construed for the
benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of
great need . . . [a]nd no practice of employers . . . can cut down the service
adjustment benefits which Congress has secured the veteran under the
Act.”111
Courts interpreting USERRA inherit the task of construing the
separate provisions of the Act as “parts of an organic whole.”112 In
interpreting each part, courts should afford the greatest protective benefit to
the veteran as the “harmonious interplay of the separate provisions
permits.”113 To achieve this goal, courts should interpret reemployment
protections broadly and affirmative defenses narrowly. Some courts have
followed this trend in holding that a service member’s right to be promptly
reemployed takes precedence over an employer’s interest to conduct preemployment tests of the employee’s physical fitness.114 Other courts have
followed this trend in holding that the only factor that should prevent a
returning veteran from being “qualified” for an employment position is
whether the veteran has exhibited dangerous or extreme behavior.115 Still
other courts have continued this pattern by holding that a veteran does not
waive his rights under USERRA by refusing an offer of reemployment that
includes anything less than proper seniority, pay and lost wages and
benefits.116 Whereas importing the ADA’s interpretation of undue hardship
would significantly broaden the employer’s affirmative defense under
USERRA, interpreting undue hardship narrowly would follow the above
trend and would limit the circumstances in which employers would be able
to deny reemployment to returning disabled veterans.
G. “Changed circumstances”: an affirmative defense that undue hardship
should model
A narrow interpretation of undue hardship would also comport with
how courts construe other affirmative defenses under USERRA. Take, for
111. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946); see also
Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1977) (citing Fishgold, 328 U.S. at
285); King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 n.9 (1991) (same).
112. Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285.
113. Id.
114. Petty v. Metro. Gov’t, 538 F.3d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 2008).
115. Lapine v. Town of Wellesley, 167 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d, 304
F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2002).
116. U.S. v. Nevada, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1245 (D. Nev. 2011) (citing Stevens v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 699 F.2d 314, 316 (6th Cir. 1983); Hanna v. Am. Motors Corp., 724
F.2d 1300, 1312–13 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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example, courts’ interpretation of the statutory exception of “changed
circumstances.” This affirmative defense excuses an employer from
reinstating a veteran when the employer’s circumstances have changed so
much that reemployment is “impossible or unreasonable.”117 Courts have
held that “changed circumstances” is a very limited exception to be applied
only where reinstatement would require “creation of a useless job or where
there has been a reduction in the work force that reasonably would have
included the veteran.”118
While there are no cases interpreting undue hardship under USERRA,
there are cases assessing “changed circumstances” that could provide a
model for how courts should interpret the undue hardship defense. In Loeb
v. Kivo, the employer refused to rehire a returning veteran because it
claimed that his position as salesman no longer existed.119 Demand for the
company’s product had increased, and because customers were coming to
the company plant to place orders, the employer reasoned that there was no
need for salesmen to go door-to-door making sales.120 The Loeb court,
however, held that this reasoning did not meet the employer’s burden to
show changed circumstances. The court rationalized that there was still
sales work to be done at the plant—there were still “[samples] to be made
up and displayed, customers to be dealt with, and orders to be taken.”121 As
a result, the employer was required to reemploy the veteran.
This case can be reframed within the context of disability. Assuming
instead that the plaintiff in Loeb was a veteran who returned from service
with a disability that inhibited him from traveling to customers’ homes, his
disability would arguably obviate the need for his services as a salesman.
The employer could argue that it should not be required to “create a useless
job” just to rehire the veteran.122 But applying the reasoning in Loeb, a
court could reject the employer’s defense and find that, based on the
specific circumstances of this employer, the employer was required to
reemploy the veteran. After all, there were still sales to be made in the
store, customers to be dealt with, and orders to be taken. By this logic,

117. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(1)(A) (2006).
118. Wrigglesworth v. Brumbaugh, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1136 (W.D. Mich. 2000)
(quoting Davis v. Halifax Cnty. Sch. Sys., 508 F. Supp. 966, 968 (E.D.N.C. 1981))
(discussing the purpose of the VRRA); see also Duarte v. Agilent Techs. Inc., 366 F. Supp.
2d 1039, 1046 (D. Colo. 2005) (noting that the legislative history of USERRA indicates that
the VRRA’s purpose and case law is to be applied when interpreting USERRA’s
provisions).
119. Loeb v. Kivo, 169 F.2d 346, 349 (S.D.N.Y 1948).
120. Id.
121. Id. See also Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 36, at 3 (discussing Loeb further).
122. Such an argument would follow the logic of Wrigglesworth, 121 F. Supp. 2d at
1126.
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finding or creating a new job for the disabled veteran—for example by
changing his responsibilities and reducing the need for travel by allowing
him to work in-house—would not create an undue hardship for the
employer, since there was enough benefit to be derived from his
reemployment to justify the costs of the position.
Other courts assessing the changed circumstances defense have held
that even when an employer is recovering from a “financial crisis,” it is not
enough to justify failure to reemploy the veteran. In Van Doren v. Van
Doren Laundry Service, the court held that reemploying a veteran is not
unreasonable or impossible even if doing so may result in “some loss of
efficiency or economy of operation.”123 While in the context of the ADA,
such costs to an employer may be enough to prove undue hardship,124 Van
Doren suggests that courts conducting a cost-benefit analysis under
USERRA should give little weight to costs associated with the employer’s
efficiency and operations. Even when the employer is financially unstable,
such costs should not outweigh the great benefits of reemploying
veterans.125 USERRA itself is a testament to those benefits.
CONCLUSION
Courts faced with the challenge of interpreting undue hardship under
USERRA should not look to undue hardship cases under the ADA for
guidance, despite their like purposes and the similarity of their definitions
of the term. Importing ADA case law to USERRA would not only defy
what the term delimits in both Acts and contravene what little guidance the
DOL regulations provide, it would also undermine the strong protections
that USERRA provides to America’s disabled service members. With
more veterans returning from war with disabilities than ever before and an
endemic problem of unemployment that disparately afflicts veterans, it is
particularly important to provide these service members with the
reemployment protections they deserve. Instead of basing decisions on the
ADA when analyzing the undue hardship defense, courts should look to
other affirmative defenses under USERRA, such as “changed
circumstances,” for guidance. Accordingly, courts should restrict the scope
123. Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Serv., 162 F.2d 1007, 1009 (3d Cir. 1947).
124. See Huber v. Wal-Mart, 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that employers
are not required to incur the loss in efficiency that would result from hiring a disabled
employee instead of the most qualified applicant for a position).
125. See Kay v. Gen. Cable Corp., 144 F.2d 653, 655 (3d Cir. 1944) (interpreting
USERRA’s predecessor, the VRRA, and stating “[a]ccepting the [employer’s] contention
that there would be some loss of efficiency and possibly some additional expense involved,
more than that is needed to justify refusal to reinstate a person within the protection of the
Act.”).
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of the undue hardship defense. Doing so would support the Act’s
important purpose of promptly reemploying those who serve our country.

